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Your guide to what the 2024 US election means for Washington and the world
The writer is chair of Rockefeller International. His latest book is ‘What Went Wrong With Capitalism’
Having turned the vote his way in just about every corner of the 50 states, Donald Trump’s victory in the race for the White House appears to reflect a sweeping turn to the populist right, across all demographics. But the US is just another country where the protest vote — not necessarily on the right or left — has become the new majority.
Widespread talk of a “global” anti-incumbency wave misses one important distinction. This year, in the 50 most populous democracies, incumbents have won 14 per cent of the elections in developed countries, compared with 73 per cent in developing countries. Approval ratings show the same stark gap; leaders are deeply unpopular on average in the developed world but are still popular in the developing world. The wave is not global, it is a revolt against long-term rot in post-capitalist economies, of which America is the leading example.
For the first time since the late 1800s, the party in power has lost three US presidential elections in a row (including Trump in 2020). With anti-incumbent hostility this strong, it’s too early for triumphal conclusions about the strength of his mandate, or the durability of his majority.
The natural election advantages once enjoyed by incumbents are gone. A century of expanding government has twisted capitalism into a system of state support for everyone, but it has lavished far greater benefits on the rich and powerful than the average American, so their revolt should be no surprise. Protest votes used to be cast for outsiders just to send an angry message to the establishment; now they are intended to put them in power.
Trump follows a long line of anti-establishment and anti-global populists that dates back to President William McKinley in the 1890s and runs through the radio priest Charles “Father” Coughlin in the 1930s, senator Joe McCarthy in the 1950s, and presidential candidates of more recent decades such as Barry Goldwater, Ross Perot and Sarah Palin. But Trump is the first in this line to reach the White House since McKinley, suggesting populist frustration is at the highest level since the 19th century.
Many explanations for his win cite recent campaign events — his courage in the face of a would-be assassin, Kamala Harris’s failure to present herself as an agent of “change”, and the price of eggs. The eggs are indeed significant. It’s long been clear to me that for incumbents, rapid growth may or may not lead to victory, but high inflation greatly increases the risk of defeat.
Yet it’s likely the Democrats would have lost even if inflation had not surged under Joe Biden, and he had been replaced earlier by a fresher candidate. What’s fuelling the protest vote is an erosion of faith in the economic future. Nine out of 10 Americans born in the 1940s grew up to earn more than their parents; today, fewer than four in 10 say they expect to do the same. Homes are less affordable for the young than at any point in living memory. Trust in many institutions is at or near all-time lows, with confidence in the presidency in the low-20s and in big business in the mid-teens.
Antipathy to big government and big business and the nexus between them has helped spur the rise of what might be called a third force in US politics. While they were a distinct minority as recently as the late 1990s, voters who say they are “independent” now represent a strong 37 per cent plurality, consistently outnumbering Democrats and Republicans, according to Gallup.
Still, there is no question that Trump-style populism taps a yearning for some ill-defined past, before globalisation unleashed a flow of jobs to China and illegal immigrants into the US, and before the unprecedented expansion of government under Biden. Now Trump needs to address the passions he has unleashed.
Despite his radical attacks on the “deep state”, Trump’s plans threaten to deliver more of the same in one key respect. Built on crowd-pleasing tax cuts, his fiscal strategy promises more government money coursing through the system and into financial markets, mainly to the benefit, again, of big corporations and billionaires.
For all the parsing of specific new “Trump trades”, US asset prices are surging in basically the same way they did under Biden. For the Republicans to break the pattern of anti-incumbency in the next round of elections, Trump needs to be a true disrupter and shift the balance of power away from the big corporations and the established rich. The mandate should be interpreted as just what it is — a firm protest vote.